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NO CILIA LEFT BEHIND: ANALYZING THE 
PRIVACY RIGHTS IN ROUTINELY SHED 
DNA FOUND AT CRIME SCENES 
Abstract: As science advances, researchers are learning more about the 
meaning of information that is contained in the human genome. Because 
we routinely shed DNA in public, this has significant implications for an 
individual’s ability to keep genetic information private. If routinely shed 
DNA is found at a crime scene, there is a significant governmental inter-
est to sequence the DNA in order to uncover suspects or potential wit-
nesses. This Note analyzes the implications of advancing technology on 
an individual’s right to privacy in one’s own genetic information, and it 
argues that informational privacy should be protected for non-phenotypic 
information in routinely shed DNA at crime scenes. 
Introduction 
 On June 26, 2000, the leaders of the Human Genome Project, 
along with the private company Celera, announced the completion of 
the first sequencing of an entire human genome.1 As scientists se-
quence more genomes, they are learning that virtually all health condi-
tions are affected to some degree by genetic factors, making genome 
sequencing increasingly important in predicting susceptibility to cer-
tain diseases.2 Because a genome contains private medical information, 
the decoding of a person’s genome without consent would seem to vio-
late that individual’s privacy.3 
 People involuntarily and continuously shed genetic material, and 
any of these stray hairs, skin particles, or other bodily fluids could be 
                                                                                                                      
1 Judit Sandor, Genetic Information: Science, Society, and Legal Norms, in Society and Ge-
netic Information 21, 25 ( Judit Sandor ed., 2003); Geoffrey Carr, Biology 2.0, Econo-
mist, June 19, 2010, at 3, 3–5. An individual’s genome consists of all the genetic informa-
tion in a person’s body. Sheldon Krimsky & Tania Simoncelli, Genetic Justice: DNA 
Data Banks, Criminal Investigations, and Civil Liberties 7 (2011). Although the 
Human Genome Project was announced as complete in 2000 by Bill Clinton and Tony 
Blair, the first entirely-sequenced genome was not published until 2003. Carr, supra, at 3. 
2 Lori Andrews et al., Genetics: Ethics, Law and Policy 2 (2002). 
3 Amitai Etzioni, DNA Tests and Databases in Criminal Justice: Individual Rights and the 
Common Good, in DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The Technology of Justice 
197, 204 (David Lazer ed., 2004). 
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used to sequence an individual’s entire genome.4 Although the utility 
of information hidden in an individual’s genome is limited by current 
technology, as more genomes are sequenced and understood, the se-
quencing of entire genomes could be used to help hunt down suspects 
and solve crimes in the next few years.5 Because laws concerning ge-
netic privacy are currently “very sparse and random,” genetic privacy 
regulation is required as technology advances.6 This Note focuses on 
the sequencing of genetic materials left at a crime scene for two rea-
sons.7 First, this situation requires balancing the interests of law en-
forcement in the information that could be provided by sequencing 
genetic material left at a crime scene against the privacy expectations of 
individuals in medical information that can be uncovered from such 
sequencing, which helps define limits on individuals’ privacy rights in 
crime scene DNA.8 Second, because any location could become a 
crime scene, this analysis could apply to any routinely shed genetic ma-
terial found in a public place.9 
                                                                                                                     
 Part I of this Note discusses the information contained in genetic 
material.10 Although scientists can currently only uncover limited in-
formation from this genetic material, this Part looks to the future and 
discusses the potential information that genetic sequencing may be 
able to provide about an individual.11 Part I also describes how genetic 
material is currently used in criminal investigations, and the roles ge-
netic sequencing could have in future investigations.12 Part II analyzes 
the privacy rights of genetic material by looking at both the existing 
body of privacy law and the academic arguments regarding privacy in 
genetic information.13 This analysis includes courts’ attempts to bal-
ance an individual’s interest in keeping genetic information private 
against the investigator’s interest in uncovering information without a 
warrant.14 From this framework, Part III argues that there should not 
 
4 Eriq Gardner, Gene Swipe: Few DNA Labs Know Whether Chromosomes Are Yours or If You Stole 
Them, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 1, 2011, 2:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/gene 
_swipe_few_dna_labs_know_whether_chromosomes_are_yours_or_if_you_stole_/. 
5 See id. An individual’s genome is made up of genes, which, when expressed, deter-
mine some characteristic about that person. See infra notes 18–26 and accompanying text. 
6 Gardner, supra note 4. 
7 See infra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 180–187 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 180–187 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 18–33 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 34–37, 62–92 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 38–92 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 93–170 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 93–163 and accompanying text. 
2013] Privacy Rights in Routinely Shed DNA Found at Crime Scenes 791 
be any privacy protection in information that a third party would oth-
erwise be able to discern by physically looking at an individual, but any 
other information should be protected from investigators without a 
warrant or a court order.15 This Note concludes that either legislation 
needs to be passed to prevent investigators from infringing the genetic 
privacy rights of individuals, or courts need to start protecting private 
medical data in genetic material.16 If new legislation is passed, this Note 
argues that it should focus on restricting investigatory procedures and 
the retention of genetic samples after they have been analyzed to pre-
vent the unauthorized use of private genetic information.17 
I. Genetic Material: How It Is Used in a Criminal Context 
A. DNA: What Is It? 
 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the molecule that provides the 
genetic blueprint for the human body and its processes.18 DNA consists 
of a string of chemicals called nucleotides.19 These nucleotides each 
contain one of four bases: adenine, guanine, cytosine, or thymine.20 
The order of these bases in a strand of DNA forms the genetic code of 
an organism.21 DNA serves as the code that provides instructions for 
responses to internal and external stimuli.22 
 Along certain stretches of DNA, the sequences of these bases, 
called genes, contain instructions for making proteins.23 Proteins form 
the structural components of cells, tissue, and the enzymes that control 
biochemical reactions, including the functioning of the genes them-
selves.24 Stretches of DNA that do not code for proteins are often called 
“junk DNA,” and may perform other functions, such as containing in-
structions for when certain genes are expressed.25 In fact, recent re-
                                                                                                                      
15 See infra notes 174–240 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 174–254 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 174–254 and accompanying text. 
18 Andrews et al., supra note 2, at 17. 
19 Id. 
20 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 4. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 5. 
23 Andrews et al., supra note 2, at 22. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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search has concluded that this “junk DNA” plays a critical role in con-
trolling how cells, organs, and other tissues behave.26 
 The International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium pre-
dicts that there are between twenty and twenty-five thousand protein-
coding genes within a human genome, whereas other groups have pre-
dicted larger numbers.27 These protein-coding genes only account for a 
small percentage of human DNA, as it is estimated that ninety-seven to 
ninety-eight percent of human DNA consists of “junk DNA.”28 
 Although humans tend to have genes that perform the same func-
tion, differences in the construction of each person’s genes cause them 
to be expressed differently in different people.29 Different versions of 
the same gene among different individuals are called alleles.30 Alleles 
not only help determine whether someone has a genetic predisposition 
toward certain diseases, but they also account for the visible differences 
between people such as eye color, skin color, and other physical charac-
teristics.31 These alleles are called a person’s genotype, and the observ-
able characteristics that are produced by differences in an individual’s 
genotype, or these different alleles, are called one’s phenotype.32 Only 
0.1% of DNA, or about three million bases, account for the genetic var-
iation that dictates the differences between any two humans.33 
 In 2003, the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) 
launched a public research consortium called the Encyclopedia of DNA 
Elements (ENCODE) to identify all functional elements in the human 
genome sequence, which would allow scientists to understand what 
causes the differences between humans.34 After successfully testing a 
one percent portion of the genome, the NHGRI funded awards in 2007 
to test the entire human genome.35 The increasing speed of computers 
                                                                                                                      
 
26 Gina Kolata, Bits of Mystery DNA, Far From ‘Junk,’ Play Crucial Role, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/science/far-from-junk-dna-dark-matter-proves- 
crucial-to-health.html. This information can be linked to a wide range of human diseases 
(e.g., multiple sclerosis, lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn’s disease, celiac disease) and 
physical traits like height. Id. 
27 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 8. 
28 Id. at 8–9; Kolata, supra note 26. Even this “junk DNA” can provide important in-
formation about an individual. Kolata, supra note 26. 
29 Andrews et al., supra note 2, at 23–24. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Sandor, supra note 1, at 27 n.14. 
33 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 9. 
34 The ENCODE Project: ENCyclopedia of DNA Elements, Nat’l Hum. Genome Res. Inst., 
http://www.genome.gov/10005107. 
35 The ENCODE Project Consortium, A User’s Guide to the Encyclopedia of DNA Elements 
(ENCODE), PLoS Biol, at e1001046 (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.genome.gov/Pages/Re- 
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and advancing testing technologies will likely soon facilitate a test that 
can sequence an entire genome within one day for under one thou-
sand dollars.36 As a result, the day in which routinely shed DNA can be 
replicated and sequenced in order to provide a complete physical and 
medical profile of a suspect or a witness in a criminal investigation is 
quickly approaching.37 
B. Past and Current Uses of DNA in a Crime Scene Context 
1. DNA Fingerprinting 
 With its currently limited sequencing capabilities, DNA testing 
serves two main purposes in the criminal context: catching criminals 
and deterring future criminals.38 In 1997, the FBI and a team of foren-
sic scientists decided that a sequence of thirteen different alleles of 
“junk DNA” would constitute an individual’s “DNA fingerprint.”39 In 
choosing these thirteen alleles, a conscious effort was made to avoid 
any sequence that had known phenotypic properties or that disclosed 
ancestral origins.40 These DNA fingerprints can be used to confirm 
whether a suspect was present at the scene of the crime, and often the-
se DNA fingerprints are put into a database where police can search for 
matches with the DNA fingerprint found at a given crime scene.41 Re-
                                                                                                                      
search/ENCODE/ENCODE_UsersGuide.pdf; Nat’l ENCODE Pilot Project, Nat’l Hum. Ge-
nome Res. Inst., http://www.genome.gov/26525202. 
36 Archon Genomics XPrize, Archon Genomics, http://genomics.xprize.org. The XPrize 
is a competition, starting in 2013, that will award ten million dollars to the first group to 
sequence 100 genomes of people over the age of 100 accurately, quickly (in under one 
day), and for under $1000 per genome sequencing. Id. 
37 See id; infra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that a person’s entire genome 
can be uncovered from a single small DNA sample left at a crime scene). 
38 Etzioni, supra note 3, at 200–01. 
39 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 18. The scientists purposely picked “junk 
DNA” because, at the time, such “junk DNA” could not be used to uncover private infor-
mation about an individual, such as medical predisposition toward diseases or information 
that could be used for racial or criminal profiling. See id. As science uncovers more infor-
mation about the “junk DNA” used in these DNA fingerprints, there is the potential that 
private information could be uncovered from this DNA. See Kolata, supra note 26. 
40 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1,  at 95; Melba Newsome, The Inconvenient Sci-
ence of Racial DNA Profiling, Wired (Oct. 5, 2007), http://www.wired.com/science/discov- 
eries/news/2007/10/dnaprint. 
41 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Relative Priority That Should Be Assigned to Trial Stage DNA 
Issues, in DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The Technology of Justice, supra 
note 3, at 91, 94–95. 
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cently, warrants have even been issued using an unknown individual’s 
genetic sequence to help solve crimes.42 
 Due to a scientific process called Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), 
a person’s entire genome can be uncovered from just a small DNA sam-
ple left at a crime scene, which may deter criminals by increasing the 
likelihood of their capture.43 PCR involves replicating tiny segments of 
an individual’s DNA through chemical copying.44 As more and more 
DNA is copied, a sufficient quantity is eventually made for analysis.45 
Because DNA is much more durable and lasts longer than antigens, en-
zymes, or proteins, and because DNA tests can be performed on very 
small sample amounts, DNA fingerprinting is more reliable than the 
traditional methods of identifying a person, such as eyewitness testi-
mony.46 Thus, PCR allows scientists to produce an entire genome even 
from a stray hair or some skin cells, which may deter criminals by in-
creasing the likelihood of capture.47 
2. Storage of DNA Fingerprints and DNA Samples in DNA Databases 
 In 1994, to facilitate the storage and use of DNA fingerprints, 
Congress passed the DNA Identification Act as part of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.48 The DNA Identification 
Act authorized the FBI to establish and maintain the Combined DNA 
Index System (CODIS), a software database that allows the sharing of 
DNA fingerprints uploaded at local, state, and federal levels.49 To this 
day, the seven million DNA profiles in CODIS are frequently subjected 
to suspicionless searches against unsolved crime scene DNA profiles.50 
                                                                                                                      
42 Id. 
43 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 14. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 14–15. 
46 Jordan Garrison, Courts Face the Exciting and the Inevitable: DNA in Civil Trials, 23 Rev. 
Litig. 435, 439–40 (2004). 
47 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 14; Etzioni, supra note 3, at 200–01. 
48 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332, 108 
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14131–14136e (2006)); Krimsky & Si-
moncelli, supra note 1, at 29. 
49 DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006); Krimsky & Simoncelli, 
supra note 1, at 29. Under the DNA Identification Act of 1994, the director of the FBI was 
authorized to establish an index of DNA identification records of persons convicted of 
crimes, analyses of DNA samples recovered from crime scenes, and analyses of DNA sam-
ples recovered from unidentified human remains. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-322, § 210304, 108 Stat. 2065, 2069 (1994). 
50 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 236. 
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 By 1998, all fifty states had authorized their own criminal DNA fin-
gerprint databases, and by 2004 all fifty state databases were linked to-
gether by CODIS, which allows users in one state to search DNA fin-
gerprints uploaded in any of the other states.51 In 2000, Congress 
passed the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act to help populate the-
se databases by requiring the collection of DNA from individuals in cus-
tody and on probation, parole, or supervised release who had been 
convicted of any “qualifying federal offense,” usually a violent crime.52 
In 2005 the databases were expanded by the Violence Against Women 
and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act, which authorized the 
U.S. Attorney General to require, through regulation and without a 
warrant, DNA to be collected from anyone arrested in the United 
States or from non-U.S. citizens detained under federal authority.53 On 
December 10, 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a final rule 
to implement the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, which granted any fed-
eral agency with authority to take fingerprints the authority to collect 
DNA.54 This rule expanded DNA collection to arrestees, a practice that 
only thirteen states had permitted before the rule’s January 2009 effec-
tive date.55 
 Although CODIS procedures are dictated by the DNA Identifica-
tion Act, which states that CODIS contain only the thirteen genes de-
fined by the DNA fingerprint standard, each state has its own DNA da-
tabases and procedures governing the use of the genetic information in 
these DNA databases.56 Although the common procedure is for investi-
                                                                                                                      
51 Id. at 29; Combined DNA Index System, Fed. Bureau Investigation, http://www.fbi. 
gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
52 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3, 114 Stat. 
2726, 2728–30 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a); Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra 
note 1, at 33. In 2001, the USA Patriot Act expanded “qualifying Federal offenses” to in-
clude any federal crime of terrorism (listed in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B) as “any crime of 
violence,” and “any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above offenses”). USA 
Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat. 272, 364 (2001). “Qualifying Federal of-
fenses” was once again expanded in 2004 to include any felony, any sex-abuse crime (un-
der Chapter 109A or Title 18), any crime of violence, and any attempt to commit any of 
the above. Justice for All Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (2004). 
53 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42 
U.S.C. § 14135a (2006); Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 33. 
54 DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal Juris-
diction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,932, 74,932–43 (Dec. 10, 2008); Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra 
note 1, at 35. 
55 DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal Juris-
diction, 73 Fed. Reg. at 74,935; Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 36. 
56 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 36; see DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 
U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2006). 
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gators to compare the DNA fingerprints obtained at crime scenes to 
those found in the database, some states have procedures that also in-
clude the storage of actual DNA samples.57 State databases are linked 
together through CODIS.58 Only eight states expressly prohibit the use 
of the DNA profiles in the databases to obtain information about hu-
man physical traits, predisposition to disease, or medical or genetic dis-
orders.59 Some states only allow the data to be used for undefined law 
enforcement purposes.60 Because all states’ databases are linked to-
gether through CODIS, this Note argues that uniform privacy regula-
tion is more practical than a state-by-state approach.61 
C. Potential Future Uses of DNA in Crime Scenes 
 There are four main ways in which DNA sequencing either has 
been tried or theoretically could be tried to help solve crimes: forensic 
DNA phenotyping, ancestral genotyping, behavioral genotyping and 
profiling, and medical phenotyping.62 Each of these methods could 
help solve crimes, but each also requires strict regulation to guard 
against abuse.63 
                                                                                                                      
57 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
58 Combined DNA Index System, Fed. Bureau Investigation, supra note 51. 
59 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 238; Seth Axelrad, Use of Forensic DNA Data-
base Information for Medical or Genetic Research, Am. Soc’y L. Med. & Ethics (2005), http:// 
www.aslme.org/dna_04/reports/axelrad3.pdf. The states that expressly prohibit the use of 
DNA databases to obtain information on physical traits, predispositions to disease, or med-
ical or genetic disorders are Indiana, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
and Wyoming. Axelrad, supra. 
60 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 238; Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, 
Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 Brook L. 
Rev. 127, 156 (2001). For instance, in 1996, the year before Massachusetts enacted a law au-
thorizing its own state DNA database, the Massachusetts legislature commissioned a study to 
research the “biological cause of crime,” which it considered a valid law enforcement pur-
pose. Barry Steinhardt, Privacy and Forensic DNA Data Banks, in DNA and the Criminal Jus-
tice System: The Technology of Justice, supra note 3, at 175, 184–85; Sonia M. Suter, All 
in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 309, 336 (2010). For a 
table of states and their respective DNA Databank statutes, see Davina Dana Bressler, Note, 
Criminal DNA Databank Statutes and Medical Research, 43 Jurimetrics J. 51, 68–70 (2002). 
61 See Combined DNA Index System, Fed. Bureau Investigation, supra note 51; infra 
notes 241–254 and accompanying text. There also is a concern that states may create new 
functions for these databases, and that these new functions may violate the privacy rights 
of individuals. See Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Danger-
ous Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 199, 203 (2006). 
62 See infra notes 64–92 and accompanying text. 
63 See infra notes 64–92 and accompanying text. 
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1. Forensic DNA Phenotyping 
 With forensic DNA phenotyping, forensic scientists can analyze 
DNA from a crime scene to determine an individual’s physical charac-
teristics, or phenotype.64 For instance, with processes like PCR, scien-
tists can take a small amount of genetic material left behind by a perpe-
trator at a crime scene, such as hair, skin flakes, or semen, and decode 
the perpetrator’s genome.65 As scientists continue to learn more about 
the relationships between an individual’s genotype and that person’s 
phenotype, the physical traits of an individual will be readily uncovered 
by decoding one’s genotype.66 Indeed, scientists can already determine 
an individual’s hair color, eye color, and ethnic background.67 As future 
research reveals more correlations between genotype and phenotype, 
law enforcement personnel will someday be able to use DNA to create a 
probabilistic model of the perpetrator’s appearance, allowing law en-
forcement to narrow lists of suspects and to operate more efficiently.68 
 Notwithstanding that forensic DNA phenotyping requires more 
research into the expression of genes in individuals’ appearances, crit-
ics argue that this correlation between phenotypes and their underly-
ing genotypes would not significantly aid law enforcement personnel.69 
Critics argue that many physical characteristics, such as hair color, eye 
color, and even body type, can be changed with modern technology 
such as plastic surgery, and that the use of phenotyping might start a 
slippery slope toward eugenics.70 
2. Ancestral Genotyping 
 Some alleles only appear in certain ethnic populations, allowing 
an individual’s genome to be used to reveal their heritage.71 Although 
                                                                                                                      
64 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 90. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. 
67 Newsome, supra note 40. 
68 See id. 
69 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 102; Bert-Jaap Koops & Maurice Schellekens, 
Forensic DNA Phenotyping: Regulatory Issues, 9 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 158, 164–65 (2008). 
70 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 102; Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, 
at 164–65, 196–98. The discovery of aggression-related genes or connections between phys-
ical features like albinism and a predisposition toward crime, for example, could be used 
to discriminate against those who are unfortunate enough to have such genes. Koops & 
Schellekens, supra note 69, at 196–98. This genetic discrimination might inflict such hard-
ship on carriers of particular genetic traits that the traits would eventually be removed 
from the gene pool. Id. 
71 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 91–93. 
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there is actually more genetic variation within ethnic and racial groups 
than between them, scientists have been able to uncover differences 
between groups that can allow them to predict the probable ethnic 
background of an individual.72 In a Louisiana investigation involving a 
serial killer, police, based on eyewitness testimony, found themselves 
looking for a white killer who drove a white truck.73 A company called 
DNAPrint Genomics offered to test DNA from the crime scenes, and it 
determined that the perpetrator had an 85% sub-Saharan African and 
15% Native American heritage.74 As a result of this ancestral genotyp-
ing, the police were able to change the direction of their investigation 
and find the serial killer.75 Although ancestral genotyping is similar to 
forensic DNA phenotyping, it is mostly used for racial and ethnic profil-
ing.76 Despite the fact that critics may disapprove of this technique, 
supporters argue that it is no different than narrowing the search for a 
perpetrator of a given race based on eyewitness testimony.77 
 A related form of ancestral genotyping is familial searching, which 
is helpful when a suspect’s DNA fingerprint cannot be obtained or is 
not in a database.78 For example, law enforcement may employ familial 
searching by using DNA databases to locate possible relatives of the 
perpetrators of a crime and then interview those relatives to ascertain 
either the suspect’s location or guilt.79 Familial searching may also be 
used to obtain a suspect’s DNA indirectly by analyzing DNA from his 
family members.80 Both of these techniques have significant implica-
tions for the genetic privacy of potentially innocent people who share 
close matches to suspects’ DNA profiles, because such testing may un-
cover private information about these individuals even though they are 
not suspected of any wrongdoing.81 
                                                                                                                      
72 Id. at 91. 
73 Id. at 92–93. 
74 Id. at 93. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. at 91–93. 
77 See Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, at 183 (discussing the debate between sup-
porters and critics of ancestral genotyping). 
78 See Suter, supra note 60, at 318–19. 
79 Id. 
80 Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforce-
ment: What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 153, 156 (2006). 
81 See Suter, supra note 60, at 342–52. 
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3. Behavioral Genotyping and Profiling 
 Behavioral genotyping and profiling seeks to find correlations be-
tween an individual’s genome and criminal behavior.82 Finding such 
links would allow police to focus investigations on those genetically 
predisposed to engage in deviant behavior like pedophilia, rape, or acts 
of aggression.83 In 1965, a study published in Nature found that “dan-
gerously violent” inmates in an Edinburgh, Scotland prison hospital 
had an extra Y chromosome as compared to the general population.84 
Although this study lacked a satisfactory control group, another study 
in 2002, published in Science, had more merit.85 In this study, research-
ers discovered a genetic marker linked to violent behavior.86 Although 
the use of psychotropic drugs might mitigate the effects of the expres-
sion of these genes, and although this material should not be used to 
predict future crimes, a genetic predisposition to aggression could be 
useful in directing an investigation in the future.87 
4. Medical Phenotyping 
 Medical phenotyping consists of decoding an individual’s genome 
to determine that individual’s disposition to certain diseases.88 The idea 
behind medical phenotyping is that, if there were a positive result for a 
disease that required medical treatment, police could track down poten-
tial suspects from hospital or pharmacy records.89 Currently, federal law 
would allow such an inquiry as long as the police have probable cause 
that an individual may have committed a crime, allowing a warrant to be 
obtained for access to medical records.90 Medical phenotyping also rais-
es serious privacy concerns, namely an individual’s right to know or not 
know about a medical condition.91 Critics argue that such disclosures 
should not be influenced by police investigations, because no significant 
                                                                                                                      
82 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 96. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.; Patricia A. Jacobs et al., Aggressive Behavior, Mental Sub-normality and the XYY Male, 
208 Nature 1351, 1351–52 (1965). The study found that 7 of 197 inmates were XXY, 
whereas the ratio of XYY in the general population was 1.3 out of every 1000 people. Ja-
cobs et al., supra, at 1351–52. 
85 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 97; see Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype 
in the Cycle of Violence of Maltreated Children, 297 Science 851, 851–54 (2002). 
86 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 97; see Caspi et al., supra note 85, at 851–54. 
87 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 97–98. 
88 Id. at 98. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 100. 
91 Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, at 175, 180–81. 
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governmental interest outweighs the invasion of an individual’s right to 
know his or her own medical predisposition to disease.92 
II. Privacy Rights in DNA 
 This Part analyzes the privacy rights in genetic material.93 Section 
A details the formation and courts’ initial interpretations of privacy 
rights.94 Section B analyzes courts’ attempts to apply these interpreta-
tions to cases involving genetic information.95 Section C focuses on the 
growing academic consensus that genetic privacy legislation must be 
enacted.96 Within this framework, Section D details the current lack of 
protection for private information contained in crime scene DNA.97 
A. Privacy According to the Courts 
 The word privacy was not prevalent in law until Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis published an influential Harvard Law Review article 
outlining a “right to privacy” that served as the foundation for future 
privacy jurisprudence.98 Privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution, 
but in 1965 the U.S. Supreme Court expressly recognized a constitu-
tional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, though the Court lo-
cated it within the penumbras of various amendments composing the 
Bill of Rights.99 In 1967, in Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the right to privacy within the Fourth Amendment, which 
protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.100 Although 
a right to privacy is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, some 
states have included provisions in their own constitutions explicitly pro-
viding a right to privacy, and courts since Katz have focused privacy ju-
                                                                                                                      
92 Id. 
93 See infra notes 98–173 and accompanying text. 
94 See infra notes 98–110 and accompanying text. 
95 See infra notes 111–163 and accompanying text. 
96 See infra notes 164–170 and accompanying text. 
97 See infra notes 171–173 and accompanying text. 
98 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 226; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brande-
is, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195–96 (1890). 
99 381 U.S. 479, 481–86 (1965); Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 226. Locating 
the right to privacy within the penumbras of the Amendments means that the Amend-
ments imply that a generalized right to privacy exists. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
100 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967). The Fourth Amendment expressly protects “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures,” but recognizes that searches of these areas may occur 
when warrants are issued “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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risprudence on either state constitutional provisions or the Fourth 
Amendment.101 
 Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz provides the controlling test 
for determining whether government action constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search.102 In Katz, the police were listening to an individ-
ual’s telephone conversations in a public telephone booth without a 
warrant.103 The Court recognized that what a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his or her own home or office, does not 
receive Fourth Amendment protection.104 But what he or she seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, such as a 
telephone call in a public telephone booth, may be constitutionally 
protected.105 Justice Harlan stated in his concurrence that, to invade an 
individual’s privacy, a person must have exhibited an actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy, and that this expectation must be one that soci-
ety is willing to recognize as reasonable.106 
                                                                                                                     
 Justice Harlan’s test was adopted and later applied in decisions, 
such as California v. Greenwood in 1988, where the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.107 In Greenwood, the Court held that, because the plaintiff depos-
ited his trash on the side of his street in an area particularly suited for 
public inspection and for the express purpose of having strangers take 
it, the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpa-
tory items that he discarded and that the police acquired without a 
warrant.108 
 In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the tension be-
tween advancing technology and reasonable expectations of privacy in 
Kyllo v. United States, where police used a thermal scanner without a war-
 
101 See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent 
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, ac-
quiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happi-
ness, and privacy.”); Fla. Const. art. I, § 23 (“Every natural person has the right to be let 
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as other-
wise provided herein.”); see also Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 226 (noting the 
existence of these more extensive state constitutional provisions). 
102 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 
242. 
103 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
104 Id. at 351–52. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
107 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988). 
108 Id. at 40–41. 
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rant to discover that a man was growing drugs in his house.109 In Kyllo, 
the Court held that the use of technology not in general public use to 
obtain information that could not otherwise have been obtained with-
out “physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area” violates 
the reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.110 
B. Privacy as Applied to Genetic Information 
 The genetic privacy case law following Katz has focused on two 
main types of warrantless searches: those involving mandatory intru-
sions into a person’s body and those that involve taking an individual’s 
sensitive information without that person’s knowledge.111 In addition, 
the courts have created uncertainty as to (1) whether the genetic mate-
rial left at a crime scene has been abandoned, thus extinguishing an 
individual’s privacy right in the material, and (2) how the storage of 
genetic information in DNA databases affects an individual’s right to 
privacy.112 
1. Mandatory Intrusions 
 Mandatory intrusions consist of a forced seizure of genetic mate-
rial from an individual without a warrant.113 The function of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the state.114 By requiring a warrant before law en-
forcement personnel can force an individual to provide genetic infor-
                                                                                                                      
109 See 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). 
110 Id. at 34–35, 40. In 2012 the U.S. Supreme Court again considered these privacy 
rights in United States v. Jones, but was split on how to treat the Katz test in a situation that 
implicated trespass onto an individual’s property. 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). In Jones, four 
justices stated that placing a GPS monitoring device on a car was a “search” that required a 
warrant, and that the Katz test was not necessarily implicated in such a trespass. Id. at 949, 
952. Four justices stated that a “search” did not occur, and that the Katz test supplanted 
traditional search and seizure analysis, which only required the demonstration that a tech-
nical trespass is sufficient to show a search. Id. at 958–59 (Alito, J., concurring). In the end, 
although it is unclear to what extent the Katz test should be applied to intrusions on prop-
erty rights, Jones affirmed the Katz test for governmental intrusions on non-property pri-
vacy rights. See id. at 953, 958–59 (Alito, J., concurring). 
111 See infra notes 113–135 and accompanying text. 
112 See infra notes 136–163 and accompanying text. 
113 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68 (1966). 
114 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. 
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mation, the Fourth Amendment ensures that a neutral magistrate will 
determine whether this intrusion is justified.115 
 In 1966 in Schmerber v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court con-
cluded that a warrantless blood test was reasonable because delaying 
the test might defeat its purpose and the test was performed in a rea-
sonable manner.116 In this case, an individual was arrested after an ac-
cident for driving under the influence and, while he was in the hospi-
tal, a blood test was taken to test for alcohol.117 The issue was whether a 
warrant was needed for this blood test, which was used to convict the 
driver.118 Despite upholding the validity of the test, the Court recog-
nized in dicta that the Constitution does not forbid the states’ minor 
intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently limited condi-
tions.119 Yet the Court noted that more substantial intrusions, or intru-
sions under other conditions, would not be reasonable.120 
 In 1989 in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, the U.S. Su-
preme Court recognized that a compelled intrusion into the body con-
stitutes a search, but the reasonableness of this search is judged by “bal-
ancing [the] intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against [the practice’s] promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests.”121 The Court had to decide whether the Federal Railroad Ad-
ministration’s regulations were valid in testing railway employees for 
drugs and alcohol.122 One of the challenged rules required the collec-
tion of blood and urine samples for testing after any collision that re-
sulted in a reportable injury or damage to railroad property of over 
fifty-thousand dollars.123 The Court held that, because of the special 
needs in such a scenario to determine whether a railroad worker was 
intoxicated, the physical intrusion of taking blood from railroad work-
ers was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.124 The Court did 
                                                                                                                      
115 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622. 
e today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor in-
trus
t 623–24. The Court reasoned that because alcohol and other drugs are elimi-
nate
 
116 384 U.S. at 770–71. 
117 Id. at 758–59. 
118 Id. at 770. 
119 Id. at 772. 
120 Id.(“That w
ions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates 
that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.”). 
121 489 U.S. at 619 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
122 Id. at 606. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. a
d from the bloodstream at a constant rate, the burden of getting a warrant would frus-
trate the governmental purpose of the search. See id. at 623. In the time it would take to 
obtain the warrant, the test would no longer be an accurate depiction of the individual’s 
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require, however, that the warrantless search be based on probable 
us
the highest expectation of pri-
cy
violation of privacy rights if the testing was authorized, or if 
privacy in discarded DNA.132 In Athan, the court considered whether the 
ca e.125 
2. Taking Sensitive Information Without Knowledge 
 As opposed to challenging the forced seizure of genetic informa-
tion, the second line of challenges to the use of genetic material in-
volves the use of tests that reveal an individual’s private, sensitive in-
formation without a warrant.126 Because medical information is the 
type of information in which one enjoys 
va , the search of this information without a warrant or a prevailing 
governmental interest that outweighs an individual’s privacy interest 
constitutes an unreasonable search.127 
 In 1998 in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that unauthorized tests that 
reveal highly sensitive medical facts are Fourth Amendment searches.128 
In this case, employees of a state and federal research facility were, with-
out their knowledge, tested for highly private and sensitive medical in-
formation, such as syphilis, sickle cell anemia, and pregnancy.129 The 
court held that these tests could be considered Fourth Amendment 
searches because individuals have the highest expectation of privacy in 
sensitive medical information.130 Yet, the court recognized that there 
would be no 
the plaintiffs reasonably should have known that the blood and urine 
samples they provided would be used for the disputed testing and failed 
to object.131 
 Unlike Norman-Bloodsaw, in 2007 the Washington Supreme Court in 
State v. Athan concluded that individuals do not have an expectation of 
                                                                                                                      
intoxication at the time of the accident. See id. Thus, the Court recognized that the “special 
needs” of this kind of scenario may make the warrant procedures impracticable. See id. at 
619, 623. 
125 Id. at 624. 
126 See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1268–70 (9th Cir. 
1998); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31–32 (Wash. 2007). 
127 Id. at 1269–70; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
128 See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1268–70. Although the court so held, it remanded 
in this case because material issues of fact existed as to whether the tests were authorized 
and whether the plaintiffs reasonably should have known that the blood and urine samples 
they provided would be used for the disputed testing and failed to object. Id. at 1270. 
129 Id. at 1269–70. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1270. 
132 See Athan, 158 P.3d at 37. 
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defendant had a privacy interest in the DNA located in saliva on an en-
velope he placed in the mail, which was used to connect him to a crime 
that had occurred twenty years earlier.133 The court held that there is no 
subjective expectation of privacy in discarded genetic material, just as 
there is no subjective expectation of privacy in fingerprints or footprints 
left in a public place.134 As a result, the court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the warrantless search, both under the Fourth Amendment and 




                                                                                                                     
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.135 
3. Abandoned or Relinquished Property Extinguishes Privacy Rights? 
 An important implication of Athan is the idea that the privacy in-
terest in discarded genetic material is extinguished when the material 
has been abandoned or relinquished.136 When police acquire DNA 
from a suspect, they often argue that such genetic material has been 
“abandoned” and, as a result, that the individual who “abandons” his or 
her DNA no longer has any privacy interest in it or the information it 
holds.137 Sometimes police have acquired DNA by offering an individ-
ual a cigarette or a drink during interrogation and collecting the items 
afterward, or they follow the individual around and pick up discarded 
items for subsequent DNA testing.138 The presumption 
ti  is that the practice of collecting and analyzing an individual’s 
DNA without his or her knowledge or consent is legal.139 
 Law enforcement personnel also argue that people have no pri-
vacy rights in DNA that has been relinquished in tissue repositories in 
the United States.140 This argument invokes United States v. Miller, where 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 held that when a person voluntarily 
relinquishes checks and deposit slips to a bank, subpoenas requirin
the bank to produce these materials do not intrude into any area in 
which the defendant had a protected Fourth Amendment interest.141 
 
133 Id. at 31–32. 
134 Id. at 37. 
135 Id.; Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 112. 
136 See 158 P.3d at 37. 
137 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 109. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Databases for Law Enforcement: The Coverage Ques-
tion and the Case for a Population-Wide Database, in DNA and the Criminal Justice System: 
The Technology of Justice, supra note 3, at 247, 259. 
141 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976); Kaye & Smith, supra note 140, at 259. 
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 Because we leave our DNA everywhere, the argument that an indi-
vidual no longer has any privacy interest in abandoned or relinquished 
DNA has serious implications for personal privacy.142 With readily avail-
able genetic testing services, nothing is stopping ordinary citizens from 
taking another person’s DNA and obtaining some basic private medical 
information.143 Therefore, the idea that abandoned or relinquished 
DNA has no privacy rights and thus can be completely sequenced with-
out a warrant has troubling consequences for the protection of sensi-
tive medical data, especially as genetic sequencing technology becomes 
 con-
victed felons without any warrant or further probable cause is not an 
“un iolation of the Fourth Amendment.147 
more advanced.144 
4. Legal Challenges to DNA Databases 
 Although the use of DNA databanks has been challenged in all 
twelve circuits as an invasion of an individual’s privacy, the constitution-
ality of the system has been upheld, though the nature of an individ-
ual’s privacy in that information is unclear.145 The seizure and analysis 
of DNA is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.146 The courts 
have generally judged that the mandatory collection of DNA from
reasonable search” in v
                                                                                                                      
142 See Gardner, supra note 4. 
143 See id. For example, the company 23andMe indicates susceptibility to genetic diseases 
and 013). 
23a
nited States v. Banks, 490 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 
200 erson, 483 F.3d 73, 89 (2d Cir. 2007) (same);  United 
Stat
2 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005); 
 
 medical conditions. 23andMe, http://www.23andme.com (last visited on Feb. 12, 2
ndMe allows consumers to mail in a tube of saliva, which is then partially sequenced in 
order to provide the consumer with ancestry information and potential health risks. Id. 
144 See Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, at 175, 180–81; Gardner, supra note 4. 
145 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 244–45; see, e.g., Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 
421, 428 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding the constitutionality of DNA databanks); United 
States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Weikert, 504 
F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2007) (same); U
7) (same); United States v. Am
es v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 
922, 924–25 (8th Cir. 2006) (same). 
146 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. 
147 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 244–45. The Second, Seventh, and Tenth cir-
cuits have followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives’ Ass’n by applying a “special needs” exception, which states that although individualized 
suspicion is generally required for a search, when a search serves a special need distinguish-
able from ordinary law-enforcement needs, such as using a DNA database to assist in solving 
crimes, this interest outweighs the privacy interest of those previously convicted of crimes. 
489 U.S. at 619–20; see Hook, 471 F.3d at 766, 773; Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 667, 672 
(2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003). Other courts 
have employed a general balancing test and have concluded that parolees and other prison-
ers under conditional release are not entitled to the full panoply of rights and protections 
possessed by the general public. United States v. Sczubelek, 40
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 Although the analysis and inclusion of DNA in a database is a 
search subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, courts 
have consistently held that accessing stored records in DNA databases is 
not a Fourth Amendment search.148 In 2010 in Boroian v. Mueller, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed that the govern-
ment’s use of CODIS to match a plaintiff’s profile against other profiles 
in the database after the plaintiff had finished his probation was limited 
to a comparison of the identification records already in the govern-
ment’s possession.149 As a result, these searches did not reveal any new, 
private, or intimate information about the plaintiff.150 In addition, the 
court recognized that the government’s comparison of the plaintiff’s 
DNA profile with other profiles in CODIS is exactly what CODIS was 
initially lawfully created for.151 As a result, the court held that the reten-
tion and matching of the plaintiff’s profile against other profiles in 
CODIS did not violate an expectation of privacy that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable, and thus did not constitute a separate 
search under the Fourth Amendment.152 
 The court in Boroian did not address whether DNA in state data-
bases can be used for purposes other than mere identification.153 The 
court refused to hold that, once the DNA sample is lawfully extracted, 
the individual loses a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
any subsequent use of that sample.154 This means that any further use 
of a DNA profile other than as a comparison to other profiles in a da-
tabase must satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.155 As genetic testing becomes less expensive, there could 
be incentives to test the DNA samples in state databases for, among 
                                                                                                                      
Pad
4); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992). 
ueller, 616 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2010); accord United States v. Mitch-
ell, 7, 411 n.21 (3d Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 
200
. 
 not hold, as some courts have suggested, that once a DNA 
sam dual and a DNA profile lawfully created, the 
indi
6 F.3d at 68, 71. 
gett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1278, 1282 (11 Cir. 2005); United States v. Kincade, 379 
F.3d 813, 833 (9th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413–14 (5th 
Cir. 200
148 See Boroian v. M
652 F.3d 38
6). 
149 616 F.3d at 67
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 67–68. 
153 See id. at 62–71. 
154 Id. at 68–69 (“We do
ple is lawfully extracted from an indivi
vidual necessarily loses a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to any subse-
quent use of that profile.”). 
155 Boroian, 61
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other things, genetic predisposition to criminal behavior.156 Yet, courts 
have provided no guidance as to what kind of further genetic testing is 
reasonable.157 Accordingly, the constitutionality of the use of DNA in 
CODIS databases for purposes other than mere identification will re-
main unknown until these tests are actually performed and chal-
ng
ted from a sample regardless of an individual’s guilt or 
rehabilitation.163 
                                                                                                                     
le ed.158 
 DNA samples stored in state databases could be put to a multitude 
of uses as genetic testing technology advances, including the decoding 
of an individual’s entire genome for research into genetic influences on 
criminality or profiling of those predisposed to criminal activity.159 
There is no national policy on the retention of physical DNA samples, 
and in almost every state the physical samples are retained indefi-
nitely.160 Law enforcement officials want to retain samples so that, as 
new technology arises, information from retained samples can be in-
cluded in future databases.161 According to these officials, the retention 
policies help reduce the cost of populating new databases if the infor-
mation captured by the databases were to change.162 This means that an 
individual’s entire genome is likely stored long after any potential incar-
ceration, or even acquittal, occurs, allowing private information to po-
tentially be extrac
C. The Extralegal Debate over Genetic Privacy 
 Although the courts have not adopted a uniform stance on genetic 
privacy, there is a growing consensus among bioethicists, medical pro-
 
156 See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (discussing how the genotypes of 
criminals could be used to identify individuals who are genetically predisposed to commit 
future offenses). 
157 See Boroian, 616 F.3d at 68, 71; Suter, supra note 60, at 331. 
158 See Boroian, 616 F.3d at 68, 71; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 
(1984) (recognizing that the Court has never held that a potential, as opposed to actual, 
invasion of privacy constitutes a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
159 See Suter, supra note 60, at 334–35; see supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
160 Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 80, at 158. Wisconsin is the only state that requires 
the destruction of all offender samples after analysis is performed, but reportedly no sam-
ples have yet been destroyed. Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 165.77 (West 2009); see Rothstein & Tal-
bott, supra note 80, at 158. Arizona requires that all samples be retained for at least thirty-
five years, and Nebraska requires that all samples be permanently retained. Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 13-610 (2010); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4105 (2009). 
161 See Nat’l Inst. of Justice, The Future of Forensic DNA Testing: Predictions 
of the Research and Development Working Group 36 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/183697.pdf. 
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
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fessionals, and legislators that an individual has a privacy right in his or 
her own DNA.164 Privacy has generally been broken down into four 
main categories: informational privacy, which consists of having control 
over highly personal information about ourselves; relational privacy, 
which consists of privacy in determining with whom we have personal, 
intimate relationships; privacy in decision making, which consists of the 
freedom to make decisions for ourselves without being watched or un-
duly influenced by others; and the right to exclude others from our 
personal things and places.165 Most of the legal debate about genetic 
privacy has focused on the bodily intrusion of obtaining a DNA sample 
and the Fourth Amendment, but as scientists continue to uncover the 
function of genes, the legal treatment of informational privacy in per-
sonal data in our genome will become an important issue.166 In the 
meantime, drawing conclusions about the information within specific 
genomes before the full significance of this DNA is understood is a 
rug
xclude others from the 
information contained in their own genome.170 
                                                                                                                     
st gle for some judges.167 
 Some scholars have argued that genetic privacy is better framed as 
a property matter.168 The Genetic Privacy Act, an unenacted legislative 
proposal drafted for the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications pro-
gram of the Human Genome Project, provides that individuals own 
their DNA, and that no one can use an individual’s DNA without au-
thorization.169 As a result, the proponents of the Genetic Privacy Act 
support individuals having a property right to e
 
164 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 113; George J. Annas et al., Guidelines for 
Protecting Privacy of Information Stored in Genetic Data Banks, in The Genetic Privacy Act 
and Commentary (1995), www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/resource/ 
privacy/privacy1.html; Press Release, Biotechnology Industry Organization, International 
Biotechnology Community Supports Genetic Privacy—BIO Seeks White House Support 
( Jun. 5, 1997), www.bio.org/media/press-release/international-biotechnology-community-
supports-genetic-privacy-bio-seeks-white-h. 
165 George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy, in DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The 
Technology of Justice, supra note 3, at 135, 135. 
166 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Strands of Privacy: DNA Databases, Informational Privacy, 
and the OECD Guidelines, in DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The Technology of 
Justice, supra note 3, at 225, 226–27; see supra notes 113–125 and accompanying text (de-
tailing the legal history covering mandatory bodily intrusions to obtain genetic material). 
167 Kincade, 370 F.3d at 850 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lack of capac-
ity to comprehend the full significance of the function of DNA in the CODIS databases 
should not preclude analysis of the privacy implications of the genetic material stored in 
those databases). 
168 See Annas, supra note 165, at 139. 
169 Id.; Annas et al., supra note 164. 
170 See Annas et al., supra note 164. 
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D. Current Crime Scene DNA Privacy Rights (or Lack Thereof) 
 Although there is an extralegal consensus that informational pri-
vacy should be protected in routinely shed DNA, there is currently no 
law that regulates or restricts the ways law enforcement can analyze evi-
dence obtained from a crime scene, including blood, tissue, hair, and 
semen.171 According to the current legal reasoning, individuals do not 
possess any privacy rights in crime scene evidence.172 If there were any 
privacy rights in this DNA, the uncovering of information from this 
DNA would require a warrant because, according to the Supreme 
Court, the Fourth Amendment requires deliberate, impartial judgment 
of a judicial officer to be interposed between a citizen and police when 
such searches occur.173 
III. What Kind of Information Should Be Protected? 
 This Part suggests that policies should be enacted to prevent police 
from uncovering private information in crime scene DNA without a 
warrant.174 Section A argues that some genetic information in crime 
scene DNA should be protected.175 Section B splits this genetic infor-
mation into two groups: phenotypic information, which is exposed to 
the public; and non-phenotypic information, which remains hidden in 
one’s genome.176 Section C criticizes the argument that non-
phenotypic information in crime scene DNA is abandoned.177 Because 
non-phenotypic information has not been abandoned and contains 
private, sensitive medical information, Section D concludes that police 
should be required by courts or by legislation to obtain a warrant to 
uncover non-phenotypic data from crime scene DNA.178 Finally, Sec-
tion E concludes that states should not be permitted to retain physical 
DNA samples indefinitely due to the ease with which non-phenotypic 
data can be revealed from these samples.179 
                                                                                                                      
171 Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 99. 
172 Id. 
173 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)); 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963)); supra notes 93–144 and accom-
panying text (detailing the judicial interpretation of privacy rights in DNA). 
174 See infra notes 180–254 and accompanying text. 
175 See infra notes 180–187 and accompanying text. 
176 See infra notes 188–210 and accompanying text. 
177 See infra notes 211–230 and accompanying text. 
178 See infra notes 231–240 and accompanying text. 
179 See infra notes 241–254 and accompanying text. 
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A. There Should Be Some Protection from Sequencing Public DNA 
 There are currently no privacy rights in crime scene DNA.180 Be-
cause this DNA could potentially be used to determine almost anything 
about a person, and because it already can be used to uncover private 
medical information such as predisposition to some diseases, decoding 
information from DNA should be strictly regulated.181 Accordingly, leg-
islation should be enacted to protect the informational privacy in pub-
lic and crime scene DNA before genetic sequencing technology be-
comes affordable and widely used.182 
 The information that should be protected from a warrantless 
search should be the same information that a court would recognize as 
infringing an individual’s right to privacy.183 The privacy rights of an 
individual depend on the standard set forth in Justice Harlan’s concur-
ring opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v. United 
States, which states that an individual must have a subjective expectation 
of privacy and society must recognize that this expectation is reasonable 
for a search to violate the Fourth Amendment.184 Currently, individuals 
likely have a subjective expectation that skin and hair left behind in 
open spaces is not being used to uncover every genetic disposition they 
have toward diseases, certain behaviors, and so forth.185 In addition, so-
ciety recognizes that this expectation is reasonable, as the strong legal 
protection for confidential medical records amply demonstrates.186 As a 
result, although it seems clear that uncovering one’s entire genome in-
fringes an individual’s privacy rights, the question remains as to how 
much information can be uncovered to satisfy law enforcement’s inter-
ests without infringing on the individual’s right to privacy.187 
B. Informational Privacy Should Protect Non-Visible Genetic Traits 
 The information that can be uncovered from an individual’s ge-
nome should be split into two groups: phenotypic information and non-
                                                                                                                      
180 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 99. 
181 See id.; Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 80, at 162; Suter, supra note 60, at 398–99. 
182 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 99; Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 80, 
at 162; Suter, supra note 60, at 398–99. 
183 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 99. 
184 See 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
185 See State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 51–53 (Wash. 2007) (Fairhurst, J., dissenting); Suter, 
supra note 60, at 356–58. 
186 See Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 51–53; Suter, supra note 60, at 356–58. 
187 See Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 51–53; Suter, supra note 60, at 356–58. 
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phenotypic information.188 Phenotypic information contains informa-
tion about a person’s physical appearance.189 Phenotypic testing could 
use DNA to uncover what a potential perpetrator may look like.190 Non-
phenotypic information is everything else on an individual’s genome, 
such as predisposition to diseases or certain behavioral traits.191 
1. Phenotypic Information 
 Determining phenotypic information from routinely shed DNA 
found at a crime scene should not have any implications on an individ-
ual’s right to privacy.192 Because phenotypic information merely de-
scribes the way that individuals look, such information cannot be con-
sidered private.193 
 First, by venturing out in public, an individual exposes his or her 
phenotypic information, such as hair color, eye color, and so forth, to 
the world.194 As stated in Katz, what a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.195 Despite the fact that Katz recognized that 
what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected, phenotypic information is 
the type of information that is almost impossible to keep private.196 Al-
though disguises, such as hair dyes and contact lenses, can change 
one’s physical appearance, these alternatives do not change the fact 
that an individual knowingly risks exposure of his or her phenotypic 
information, whether it be from a contact lens falling out, a visible sur-
gery scar, or a brown hair peeking through a full head of blond hair.197 
Whether a witness to a crime relays information about a potential sus-
pect or the police uncover that information via discarded DNA, an in-
                                                                                                                      
188 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 90; Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, 
at 164–65. 
189 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 90; Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, 
at 164–65. 
190 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 90; Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, 
at 164–65. 
191 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 90; Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, 
at 164–65 
192 See infra notes 194–201 and accompanying text. 
193 See infra notes 194–201 and accompanying text. 
194 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52. 
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196 See Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, at 164–65. 
197 See id. at 182. 
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dividual has exposed this information to the public, extinguishing any 
privacy right.198 
 Second, although one could argue that routinely shed DNA 
should not qualify as knowing exposure of personal information to the 
public, an individual does not have an expectation of privacy in his or 
her own phenotypic information that society would recognize as rea-
sonable.199 The Katz test requires that an individual have a subjective 
expectation of privacy and that society recognize that this expectation is 
reasonable.200 By venturing into public, an individual is unable to re-
tain the anonymity that he or she might enjoy in private, and, as a re-
sult, society would not recognize this expectation of anonymity to be 
reasonable, especially if one is a suspect or potential witness to a 
crime.201 
. N
ples would be used for certain kinds of test-
g a
                                                                                                                     
2 on-Phenotypic Information 
 Non-phenotypic information includes information such as disposi-
tion toward certain diseases or behavioral tendencies, and this informa-
tion should be protected from warrantless search.202 Non-phenotypic 
information is identical to highly private and sensitive medical facts, in 
which individuals have the highest expectation of privacy.203 As the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized in 1998 in Norman-
Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, privacy rights can be circum-
vented if the testing is authorized, or if individuals reasonably should 
have known that DNA sam
in nd failed to object.204 
 In the case of non-phenotypic information found at crime scenes, 
it is important to recognize that, unlike the holding in 2007 in State v. 
Athan, some privacy rights do exist in discarded genetic material.205 In 
2001 in Kyllo v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that 
the use of technology not in general public use to obtain information 
 
198 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, at 182. 
199 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (implying that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information that cannot be obtained without a physical intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area). 
200 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
201 See id. 
202 See Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, at 182–83. 
203 See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
204 See id. at 1270. 
205 See infra notes 206–210 and accompanying text. 
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that could not otherwise have been obtained without “physical intru-
sion into a constitutionally protected area” violates the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.206 Until 
people can readily sequence genomes in a way that constitutes general 
public use, this test should control whether or not the sequencing of a 
genome without permission violates an individual’s privacy.207 Apart 
from the testing of routinely shed DNA, this detailed medical informa-
tion in a person’s non-phenotypic information can only be obtained 
through a mandatory intrusion into a person’s body from a DNA test, 
unlike phenotypic information which can be obtained through eyewit-
ness testimony by a casual observer without intruding on a constitu-
tionally protected area.208 Courts have held that these kinds of war-
rantless intrusions are only permissible when an important governmen-
tal interest outweighs the individual’s privacy interest and the individual 
has not authorized these intrusions.209 With respect to non-phenotypic 
information, the individual’s privacy interest is so strong that there is 
unlikely to be a governmental interest that can outweigh the privacy 
interest, and thus, like the private data in medical records, the govern-
ment should be required to seek a warrant and to defend its intrusion 
into an individual’s privacy.210 
                                                                                                                     
C. Discarded DNA Is Not Abandoned 
 Although the court in Athan held that there is no expectation of 
privacy in discarded genetic material because it is abandoned, the con-
curring opinion cautioned that this dicta should be limited in future 
application.211 Abandonment in the search and seizure context is not 
the same as abandonment in property law.212 In the Fourth Amend-
 
206 533 U.S. at 40. 
207 See Suter, supra note 60, at 357–58. Even if sequencing technology becomes publicly 
available, the reasonable expectation that routinely shed DNA will not be sequenced 
should prevent such sequencing from gaining acceptance. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Norman-
Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1270. 
208 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
209 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 603, 622 (1989); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1270. 
210 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 100–01. Although the government may 
have an interest in obtaining this information, this interest must outweigh the highest 
expectation of privacy an individual has in keeping this information private, and this kind 
of calculation is the type that an impartial magistrate should make in issuing a warrant. See 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622; Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 100–01. 
211 158 P.3d at 44 n.1 (Alexander, C.J., concurring). 
212 See State v. Daniels, 576 So. 2d 819, 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Kerr, 470 
A.2d 670, 676 (Vt. 1983); 79 C.J.S. Searches § 38 (2012). 
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ment context, abandonment occurs only if a person relinquishes a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in an item, for example by leaving an 
item unsecured in a public place.213 Another requirement is that aban-
donment must be voluntary.214 Although venturing into public is a vol-
untary act, shedding DNA is involuntary.215 Thus, even though leaving 
a piece of tangible property behind in a public place is considered 
abandonment, the inevitable and uncontrollable shedding of skin cells 
and other genetic material is fundamentally different because shedding 
is not a conscious, voluntary act.216 Because DNA found in a public 
space such as a crime scene was likely left behind unintentionally by 
routine shedding, the genetic material has not been abandoned or re-
linquished and, as a result, an individual’s privacy right in the private, 
non-phenotypic information contained in that DNA should continue to 
e p
                                               
b rotected.217 
 Although routinely shed DNA is uncontrollable and thus should 
not be considered abandoned, this rule could be reconciled with case 
law by requiring some conscious or subconscious act for DNA to be 
considered abandoned.218 The Athan court stated that saliva from an 
envelope was abandoned,219 and other courts have similarly found that 
saliva from cigarettes220 and cups was abandoned.221 This abandon-
ment of genetic material, although subconscious and arguably uninten-
tional, is fundamentally different from routinely shed DNA because the 
act that caused the DNA to be left behind was voluntary.222 In these 
cases, individuals can control the relinquishment of genetic material, 
they just elect not to or ignore such a right.223 This volitional aspect is 
                                                                       
3d 938, 943 (Utah 2005); 79 C.J.S. Searches § 38. 
 1991); 79 C.J.S. Searches 
§ 38
edding is involuntary and there is no rea-
sona be analyzed; thus, privacy rights have 
not 
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215 See Athan, 158 P.3d at 44 n.1 (Alexander, C.J., concurring). 
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ble expectation that this genetic information will 
been extinguished in routinely shed DNA). 
217 See Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 80, at 156. 
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, 883 N.E.2d 230, 239 (Mass. 20
219 158 P.3d at 37. 
220 Perkins, 883 N.E.2d at 239. 
221 Williamson, 993 A.2d at 634–35. 
222 See id.; Perkins, 883 N.E.2d at 239; Athan, 158 P.3d at 37. 
223 See Williamson, 998 A.2d a
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markedly absent when an individual routinely sheds DNA.224 As a re-
sult, unlike the volitional aspect of leaving behind saliva on a cigarette 
or a cup, the fact that an individual decided to venture out into public 
should not destroy any protectable privacy right in routinely shed ge-
netic material because an individual has no reasonable expectation that 
 discarded DNA 
for identification purposes, namely phenotypic data.230 
D. Police Should Obtain a on-Phenotypic Data from 
                                                                                                                     
their shed DNA could possibly be analyzed.225 
 Although some cases state that any genetic material left behind as a 
result of a volitional act is abandoned, this is not necessary.226 Genetic 
material that is left behind as a result of a volitional act is often subcon-
scious, and the distinction between subconscious and involuntary is only 
semantic.227 A person who licks an envelope closed should not receive 
less protection from the disclosure of his or her medical history than a 
person who sheds skin cells on that envelope, because regardless of how 
the DNA gets on the envelope, there is no difference in the privacy ex-
pectations of these two individuals.228 As a result, the Athan dissent’s rea-
soning that there is a privacy interest in discarded DNA should pre-
vail.229 Therefore, instead of barring the use of routinely shed DNA en-
tirely, law enforcement should be permitted to analyze
 Warrant to Uncover N
Routinely Shed DNA 
 There is no privacy interest in phenotypic data contained in dis-
carded DNA.231 As a result, when routinely shed DNA is found at a 
crime scene, there is no reason that the phenotypic information cannot 
be extracted to help narrow lists of suspects or serve other law en-
forcement purposes.232 When it comes to non-phenotypic information, 
however, it seems clear that a privacy interest exists.233 Indeed, police 
 
224 See Williamson, 998 A.2d at 634–35; Perkins, 883 N.E.2d at 239; Athan, 158 P.3d at 37; 
Sute
634–35; Perkins, 883 N.E.2d at 239; Athan, 158 P.3d at 37; 
Sute
sprudence im-
prac panying text. 
n, 158 P.3d at 41–42 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting). 
 
r, supra note 60, at 352–58. 
225 See Williamson, 998 A.2d at 
r, supra note 60, at 352–58. 
226 See supra notes 218–225 and accompanying text. 
227 See Daniel Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1511, 1530–31 (2010) 
(arguing that this semantic test makes the current Fourth Amendment juri
ticable in the future); see also infra notes 222–225 and accom
228 See Atha
229 See id. 
230 See supra notes 180–229 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra notes 180–201 and accompanying text. 
232 See Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69 at 182–83.
233 See supra notes 202–210 and accompanying text. 
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currently need a warrant to access medical records that may contain 
this private information.234 The warrant process could also serve as a 
buffer between law enforcement and the private information contained 
in routinely shed DNA.235 Therefore, the government should be re-
c information in the-
se situations should not prevent phenotypic information from being 
uncove
                                                                                                                     
quired to obtain a warrant and to articulate an interest that outweighs 
an individual’s right to privacy in non-phenotypic information.236 
 As for decoding areas of the genome that code for both pheno-
typic and non-phenotypic information absent a warrant, such as an area 
that codes for both gender and predisposition for a disease, this infor-
mation should only be uncovered to the extent that it reveals pheno-
typic information.237 The Supreme Court has recognized that searches 
conducted without warrants have been held unlawful notwithstanding 
facts unquestionably showing probable cause because the Constitution 
requires deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer to be inter-
posed between a citizen and the police.238 Although in these instances 
some phenotypic information may provide glimpses into private non-
phenotypic information, these observations could be uncovered by an 
observer’s naked eye and knowledge of these correlations.239 Thus, as-
sociations between phenotypic and non-phenotypi
red solely for identification purposes.240 
 
234 See Krimsky & Simoncelli, supra note 1, at 100–01. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 80, at 160–61. Extracting phenotypic informa-
tion from those whose DNA is already in CODIS and including it in the CODIS database 
without including any non-phenotypic information from that same region of an individ-
ual’s genome would likely not violate any expectation of privacy that society is willing to 
recognize as reasonable because the only information that is being stored and potentially 
disseminated is phenotypic information, which an individual cannot reasonably expect to 
keep private. See id. 
238 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
239 See infra note 240. Although some studies show correlations between trivial traits 
and sensitive information (i.e., that left-handed people appear to die more often in an 
accident than right-handed people), there is no reason that uncovering this information 
through genetic testing would infringe on an individual’s privacy any more than the nor-
mal observation of a witness. See Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, at 182 n.90. In addi-
tion, unlike the arguments of scholars like Rothstein and Talbott, filtering phenotypic 
information out from non-phenotypic information should not be any more difficult in 
practice than filtering out the thirteen loci used in DNA fingerprinting from all of the 
potential material in a genome. See Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 80, at 160–61. 
240 See Koops & Schellekens, supra note 69, at 182 n.90. 
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E. State Databases Should Not Retain DNA Samples Indefinitely 
 DNA databases should not contain physical DNA samples and, to 
the extent that they do, the DNA samples should not be retained in-
definitely.241 Two main justifications have been presented for maintain-
ing and using DNA databases: deterring future crime and preventing 
ecidr ivism by facilitating the identification of repeat offenders.242 Be-
cause both of these purposes can be achieved using only phenotypic 
information logged in DNA databases, there is not a sufficient reason 
for states to retain the actual DNA samples in perpetuity.243 
 Permanent retention of DNA samples should not be permitted for 
four main reasons.244 First, despite the fact that some courts have ruled 
that convicted felons have a reduced right of privacy, maintaining DNA 
samples and having potential access to non-phenotypic information is 
not required for the government to accomplish its goals of combating 
recidivism and deterring future crime.245 These goals can be accom-
plished simply with the inclusion of phenotypic information in a DNA 
database.246 Second, because phenotypic information extracted from 
DNA is easily confirmed by visual observation, the justification that the 
samples must be maintained in case mistakes are made would no long-
er apply.247 Third, because DNA samples are allowed to be taken from 
arrestees, the retention of samples from those who are acquitted is un-
reasonable as these individuals do not have a diminished privacy 
right.248 This means that the privacy rights for those who are acquitted 
vastly outweigh the almost negligible governmental interests in main-
taining this genetic information.249 Finally, the last justification for law 
enforcement officials retaining these samples is so that, as new tech-
nology arises, the samples can be used to update the databases to new 
standards.250 Once the genome is understood and phenotypic informa-
tion is distinguishable from non-phenotypic information, the databases 
will already contain all the required phenotypic information, and there 
would be no justification at that point for having private, non-
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phenotypic information readily accessible in these genetic databases, 
which means that policies must be implemented so that samples are 
ot r
ect individuals’ genetic privacy interests 
without any legal or legislative oversight.254 
ations when crime scene 
NA
                                                                                                                     
n etained indefinitely.251 
 Because genome sequencing may become more popular in the fu-
ture, states should provide some sort of legal check to prevent DNA da-
tabases from potentially including private non-phenotypic informa-
tion.252 Without providing for the destruction of DNA samples, there is 
a legitimate fear that these databases may take on new functions that 
invade the privacy rights of individuals.253 Although police can and 
should use fingerprints, which do not say anything about a person’s 
health, propensity for a particular disease, race or gender characteris-
tics, or propensity for certain conduct, law enforcement personnel 
should not be trusted to prot
Conclusion 
 Genetic information from routinely shed DNA can be broken up 
into two types, phenotypic and non-phenotypic information. Because 
phenotypic information describes visible information about an individ-
ual that can be uncovered easily without sequencing the DNA, an indi-
vidual does not have a significant privacy interest in this kind of infor-
mation. As a result, there are no privacy implic
D  is sequenced to narrow a list of suspects. 
 Non-phenotypic information, on the other hand, contains private 
information. As a result, an individual has a reasonable expectation 
that this information will be kept private and will not be unreasonably 
uncovered. Despite arguments that the privacy interest in this kind of 
information is extinguished because crime scene DNA has been “aban-
doned” or “relinquished,” such arguments should not be applied to 
circumvent the warrant process. Instead, just as in cases of medical re-
cords, the government should have to show probable cause or some 
sort of individualized suspicion in order to uncover this kind of infor-
mation. Otherwise, innocent individuals may soon find their entire ge-
 
251 See id. 
252 See Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 80, at 158; see also Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 165.77 
(West 2009) (requiring destruction after analysis has been completed and the applicable 
court proceedings have ended). Reportedly, no samples have yet been destroyed. Roth-
stein & Talbott, supra note 80, at 158. 
253 See Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 61, at 203. 
254 See Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 80, at 158; supra notes 62–92 and accompanying 
text. 
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entured into public and unknowingly lost 
e sort of limits on the duration of retention of physical DNA 
samples. 
David Gusella 
nomes in DNA databases not because they have committed any crime, 
but instead because they v
some hair or skin particles. 
 Finally, because physical DNA samples contain both phenotypic 
and non-phenotypic information, states should not retain physical DNA 
samples in perpetuity. The purpose of DNA databases is to prevent fu-
ture crime and to combat recidivism by using the information to catch 
repeat offenders. The government’s purpose in maintaining DNA sam-
ples does not outweigh the privacy rights of individuals because main-
taining these samples ostensibly serves no governmental purpose. De-
spite the fact that many courts have found that convicted felons have a 
reduced privacy interest due to their past crimes, this privacy interest is 
diminished, not non-existent. In addition, because innocent people 
may be included in this database, their right to privacy in their genetic 
information should outweigh the minimal governmental interest in 
having access to non-phenotypic information. As a result, states should 
adopt som
